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Notes
Union-Negotiated Waivers of an Employee's

Federal Forum Rights to Statutory Claims:
Are They an Effective Means to Exclusivity?
Wright v. UniversalMaritimeService Corp.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Virtually every collective bargaining agreement provides for the use of
labor arbitration in the event that the employer, and the union representing the
employee, are unable to reach a mutually agreeable result.' However, even after
Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp.,3 it remains unclear whether an

agreement to arbitrate can require arbitration to be an individual employee's
exclusive forum for federal statutory claims. This Note analyzes the United
States Supreme Court holding in Wright, and also analyzes both the case law
leading up to the Court's decision, and the existing split among the federal
circuits as to whether union-negotiated waivers of an employee's federal forum
rights are effective in mandating arbitration as the only available forum.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 1970, Caesar Wright began his employment as a longshoreman in
Charleston, South Carolina.4 At that time, Wright also became a member ofthe
Local 1422 of the International Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO
("Union").5 The Union provided a hiring hall that supplied workers to several
stevedoring companies, represented by the South Carolina Stevedores
Association ("SCSA").6 Pursuant to the relationship between SCSA and the
Union, the two organizations entered into a collective bargaining agreement

1. 525 U.S. 70 (1998).
2. Thomas R. Bricker, Note, A LaborArbitrator'sAbility to Modify a Termination
OrderBased on Employer Violations ofthe GrievanceProcedure,9 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsp.

REsOL. 373, 373 (1994).
3. 525 U.S. 70 (1998).
4. Id. at 72.
5. Id.
6. Id. The SCSA is a multi-employer bargaining unit organized by several
stevedoring companies for the purposes of collectively bargaining with the union.
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("CBA"). 7 The CBA compelled all union employees to arbitrate "all matters
affecting wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment."'
Specifically, the CBA provided that any "matters under dispute which
[could not] be promptly settled between the Local and an individual [e]mployer,"
should be referred in writing to a "Port Grievance Committee" within 48 hours.9
If, however, the Port Grievance Committee 0 was unable to reach an agreement
within five days after receiving the complaint, the dispute was then to be referred
to the District Grievance Committee. The bargaining agreement provided that
any majority decision by this District Committee was "final and binding."' 2
However, if the District Committee also was unable to reach a majority decision
within seventy-two hours after meeting, the committee was required to seek the
services of a professional arbitrator. 3
After more than two decades of employment as a longshoreman, Wright
injured his right heel and his back. 4 Wright originally sought compensation for
his permanent disability under the Longshore and Harbor Worker's
Compensation Act, but later settled his claim for $250,000 and $10,000 in
attorney's fees.' 5 After an absence of nearly three years from his employment,
Wright returned to the union hiring hall and requested work. 16 Over a ten-day
period Wright worked for four different stevedoring companies, none of which
complained about his work performance. 7 However, once the stevedoring
companies realized that Wright had previously settled a claim for a permanent
disability against them, the stevedoring companies informed the Union that they
would no longer accept Wright for employment.' 8 The employers informed the
7. Id.
8. Id. at 73.
9. Id. at 72.

10. The Port Grievance committee is composed of representatives evenly divided
from labor and management. Id.
11. Id. at 72-73. The Grievance Committee is also evenly composed of
representatives of labor and management. Id. at 73.
12. Id.

13. Id.
14. Id. at 74. The accident occurred on February 18, 1992, while Wright was
working for Stevens Shipping. Id. Wright fell off the top of a freight container and
shattered his right heel and injured his back. Id. These injuries prevented Wright from
engaging in longshore employment for almost three years. Petitioner's Brief, Wright v.
Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (1998) (No. 97-889), availablein 1998 WL
232769, at *2.
15. Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 74 (1998).
16. Id. Apparently, a "major factor in [Wright's] physical disability was a bony
spike in his right heel that made walking extremely painful. In late 1994 [however], the
bony spike was spontaneously resorbed" and Wright was able to return to work.
Petitioner's Brief, Wright (No. 97-889), available in 1998 WL 232769, at *3.
17. Wright, 525 U.S. at 74.
18. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss1/11
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Union that employees who were "permanently disabled" were not qualified to
perform longshore work under the CBA.' 9
Wright, however, continued to contact the Union about possibly locating
longshoreman employment.20 The Union suggested to Wright that, in lieu of
filing a grievance, he should obtain legal counsel and file a claim under the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA").2 1 Following the Union's advice,
Wright filed charges of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC") and the South Carolina State Human Affairs
Commission, alleging a violation of the ADA.22 In October 1995, Wright
received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC.23 In January 1996, Wright filed his
complaint, naming as defendants the SCSA and six individual stevedoring
companies. 24 Respondents (SCSA and the individual stevedoring companies)
asserted various affirmative defenses, including Wright's failure to exhaust his
existing remedies under the CBA
The district court agreed with the
respondents and dismissed the suit without prejudice, stating that Wright was
required to seek his remedy through the grievance procedure provided within the
CBA.26 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
district court's dismissal.27 The Fourth Circuit, relying on prior case law, stated
that "collective bargaining agreements to arbitrate employment disputes are
binding upon individual employees even when the dispute involves a federal
cause of action."28 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.29
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Wright argued that both the district court
and the Fourth Circuit erred in concluding that his federal forum rights to an
ADA statutory claim could be waived by a collective bargaining agreement. 0
Wright argued that the Fourth Circuit's holding resulted from an unfair reading
of the leading case, Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp.31 Wright asserted

that Gilmer validated only those waivers resulting from individually executed
contracts, not collectively bargained contracts.32 In contrast, Respondents
argued that the Fourth Circuit's reliance on Gilmer was entirely appropriate.

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 74-75.
Id. at 75.
Id.
Id.
Id.
27. Id.; Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., No. 96-2850, 1997 WL 422869
(4th Cir. July 29, 1997).
28. Wright, 1997 WL 422869, at *2.
29. Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 75 (1998).
30. Id.
31. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
32. Wright, 525 U.S. at 77.
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Respondents suggested that due to the existing "federal policy favoring
arbitration," a collective bargaining agreement indeed could serve as an effective
waiver of an individual's federal forum rights.33
The Supreme Court, however, specifically declined to resolve this highly
controversial issue, and instead rested its decision on alternative grounds.34 The
Court held that because the particular collective bargaining agreement at issue
failed to provide a "clear and unmistakable" waiver of Wright's federal forum
rights to his ADA statutory claim, deciding the overarching issue of the
enforceability of a "clear and unmistakable" collectively bargained waiver was
not necessary.35 Therefore, because no "clear and unmistakable wavier" existed,
Wright was not estopped from asserting his statutory rights to a federal forum for
resolution of his ADA claim. 6

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The use of alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") techniques to prevent and
resolve disputes in the labor arena has experienced dramatic growth over the last
several decades. 37 In particular, binding arbitration has become a popular
technique used by employers seeking to resolve workplace discrimination
complaints.38 Such binding arbitration has been used quite effectively in both the
conventional employment arbitration setting and the labor-management
arbitration setting.39 Whereas labor-management arbitration "refers to the
grievance procedure mandated by collective bargaining agreements between
employers and unions," ' employment arbitration "refers to all arbitration used
in contexts other than in the labor arena and includes the general commercial,
securities, construction, and textile industries."'" The former of these two
settings, labor-management arbitration, is the focus of this Part.

33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
Id. at 81-82.
Id. at 82.
Id.
37. See FRANK ELKOuRI & EDNA ASPER ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS (5th
ed. 1997); Frank Evans & Shadow Sloan, ResolvingEmployment DisputesThrough ADR
Processes,37 S. TEX. L. REV. 745, 753 (1996) ("[T]he ADR movement has swept like
wildfire across the United States."); Carla W. McMillian, Note, Collective Bargaining
Agreements, Mandatory Arbitration,and Title VII. Vamer v. National Super Markets,
Inc., 32 GA. L. REV. 287, 292 (1997) (citing LEONARD L. RISKIN & JAMES E.
WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS: ABRIDGED EDITION 1-7 (1987)).

38. McMillian, supra note 37, at 292.
39. McMillian, supra note 37, at 292.
40. McMillian, supra note 37, at 293.
41. McMillian, supra note 37, at 293.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss1/11
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A. The Integrity ofMandatoryArbitration Clauses Under Collective
BargainingAgreements
In modem society, arbitration clauses contained within collective
bargaining agreements have become commonplace. However, it was not until
the middle of the twentieth century that Congress and the Supreme Court first
began to consistently recognize these arbitration clauses as enforceable.
Congressional action, via the enactment of the National Labor Relations
Act ("NLRA" or "Wagner Act"),42 came first. The NLRA was passed by
Congress after it recognized an inherent inequality of bargaining power between
individual employees and their employers. To help remedy this imbalance,
Congress provided individual employees with the right to collectively bargain
with their employers regarding working conditions.43 Such a right, Congress
suggested, would help neutralize the inherent inequality between individual
employees and their respective employers. Congress furthered its legislative
efforts by enacting the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA" or "TaftHartley Act").' The LMRA went one step further and announced a new federal
policy in favor of binding labor arbitration.4 s Specifically, Section 203(d)
provided that "[flinal adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is .'..
to be the desirablemethod for settlement of grievance disputes.'" The Supreme
47
Court followed suit in three cases termed the Steelworkers Trilogy, and
announced that "arbitration of labor disputes under collective bargaining
8
agreements is part and parcel of the collective bargaining process itself.'" With
this announcement, the Court denounced its prior hostility toward arbitration and
instead endorsed the existent congressional policy favoring enforceability of
49
arbitration clauses contained within collective bargaining agreements.
The first of the Steelworkers Trilogy was United Steelworkers v. American
Manufacturing Co. 50 In American Manufacturing, the Union petitioned the
Court to compel arbitration of a grievance between the Union, on behalf of the
employee, and the employer.5' The Court noted that the collective bargaining
agreement contained an arbitration clause stating that "[a]ny disputes,

42. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994).
43. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994).
44. 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1994).
45. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582
(1960).
46. 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1994) (emphasis added).
47. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960);
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American
Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
48. Warrior& GulfNavigation Co., 363 U.S. at 578 (1960).
49. Id.
50. 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
51. Id. at 564.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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misunderstandings, differences or grievances arising between the parties as to the
meaning, interpretation and application of the provisions of this [collective
bargaining] agreement... may be submitted to the Board of Arbitration for
53
decision." 52 The Supreme Court then referenced Section 203(d) of the LMRA.
This statutory provision provided that "[f]inal adjustment by a method agreed
upon by the parties is [t]hereby declared to be the desirable method for
settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of
' The
an existing collective bargaining agreement."54
Court concluded that only
by giving "full play" to the means chosen for settlement (arbitration) would the
congressional policy in Section 203(d) be effectuated.5 Therefore, the Court
granted the Union's petition to compel arbitration.
Likewise, in United Steelworkers v. Warrior& GulfNavigation Co.,56 the
Union petitioned the Court to compel arbitration by the employer.5 7 The Court
noted that the "present federal policy is to promote industrial stabilization
through the collective bargaining agreement." 58 The Court then remarked that
"[a] major factor in achieving industrial peace is the inclusion of a provision for
arbitration of grievances in the collective bargaining agreement."59 Further, the
Court noted that mandatory arbitration clauses were enforceable pursuant to
Section 301(a) of the LMRA.60
Finally, in United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp.,61 the Court narrowly construed its judicial review power over decisions
made by arbitrators pursuant to collectively-bargained arbitration clauses.
Specifically, the Court noted that "an arbitrator is confined to interpretation and
application of the collective bargaining agreement., 62 However, so long as the
arbitrator's decision, drew "its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement,, 63 the Court would not stand in the way of the arbitrator's decision.
In sum, afterthe Court's holdings in the Steelworkers Trilogy, the integrity
of binding arbitration clauses within collective bargaining agreements was no
longer questionable. Simply put, there now existed an impressive federal policy,

52. Id. at565 n.1.
53. 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1994).
54. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 566 (1960).
55. Id.

56. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 578 (citing Section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.

§ 158(d) (1994)).
59. Id.
60. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1994).
61. 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
62. Id. at 597.
63. Id.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss1/11
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endorsed by both congressional and Supreme Court action, in favor of resolving
labor disputes by way of mandatory arbitration.'
B. The Union-Negotiated Waiver of FederalStatutory Claims:
IndividualFederalForum Rights Prevail
While the Supreme Court was becoming receptive to arbitration as an
alternative means of resolving labor disputes, "this reception did not extend to
all employment related disputes occurring in the context of organized labor." 65
Specifically, a series of cases handed down by the Court "held66 that statutory
rights could not be subordinated to the confines of arbitration.,
In the seminal case, Alexander v. Gardner-DenverCo.,67 the Supreme Court

struck its first blow to arbitration clauses contained within collective bargaining
agreements. Specifically, the Court refused to hold that arbitration of an
employee's Title VII claims precluded an employee from also filing a Title VII
claim in federal court, despite the existence of the arbitration clause within the
collective bargaining agreement.6" The Court stated that even though "a union
can waive certain statutory rights related to collective activity, such as the right
to strike," there could "be no prospective waiver of an employee's [federal
forum] rights under Title VII. 69 Further, the Court stated that "[t]he purpose
and procedures of Title VII indicate that Congress intended federal courts to
exercise final responsibility for enforcement of Title VII," and that "deferral to
arbitral decisions is inconsistent with that goal. 70

64. Id.
65. William H. Daughtrey, Jr. & Donnie L. Kidd, Jr., ModificationsNecessaryfor
Commercial Arbitration Law to Protect Statutory Rights Against Discriminationin
Employment: A Discussion and Proposalsfor Change, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.

29, 51 (1998).
66. Id.
67. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
68. Id. at 51.

69. Id.
70. Id. at 56. However, the Court did suggest that an arbitral decision could be
admitted as evidence in federal court and accorded such weight as the court deemed
appropriate. Id. at 60. While the Court did not adopt any required standards in
determining the weight the arbitral decision must be accorded, the Court did provide the

following discussion regarding considerations that a lower federal court should make:
Relevant factors include the existence of provisions in the collectivebargaining agreement that conform substantially with Title VII, the degree of
procedural fairness in the arbitral forum, adequacy of the record with respect
to the issue of discrimination, and the special competence of particular
arbitrators. Where an arbitral determination gives full consideration to an
employee's Title VII rights, a court may properly accord it great weight. This
is especially true where the issue is solely one of fact, specifically addressed
by the parties and decided by the arbitrator on the basis of an adequate record.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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In Gardner-Denver,the Court refuted the notion "that arbitral processes are
commensurate with judicial processes."'" The Court first suggested that one
inadequacy of the arbitral process is due to the special role of the arbitrator, in
that the arbitrator is required to effectuate the intent of the parties involved
ratherthan the requirements of federal legislation.' As such, where the details
of the collective bargaining agreement would conflict with the requirements of
federal law, an arbitrator would necessarily be bound by the collective
bargaining agreement. Such a result, the Court intimated, certainly ran afoul of
congressional intent. 3 The Court also noted that an arbitrator's "specialized
competence... pertains primarily to the law of the shop, not the law of the
land." 74 Therefore, the Court suggested that courts, not arbitrators, be given the
responsibility of interpreting "the law of the land [federal statutory claims, like
the ADA]."75 "Additionally, the Court suggested that the fact-finding process
used in arbitration proceedings is not equivalent to the judicial fact-finding
process.76 The Court expressed additional concerns that "[t]he record of the
arbitration proceedings is not as complete; the usual rules of evidence do not
apply; and rights and procedures common to civil trials, such as discovery,
compulsory process, cross-examination,
and testimony under oath, are often
' 77
severely limited or unavailable.
Finally, in a highly persuasive footnote, the Gardner-Denver Court
expressed one last major concern with allowing arbitration as a commensurate
forum to the federal courts for the resolution of statutory claims. 7 8 Specifically,
the Court was concerned with the notion that unions have exclusive control over
the manner and extent to which an individual grievance is presented. 79 The
Court noted that "[i]n arbitration, as in the collective bargaining process, the
interests of the individual employee may be subordinated to the collective
interests of all employees in the bargaining unit."'
Moreover, the Court
continued, "[h]armony of interest between the union and the individual

But courts should ever [be] mindful that Congress, in enacting Title VII,
thought it necessary to provide a judicial forum for the ultimate resolution of
discriminatory employment claims. It is the duty of courts to assure the full
availability of this forum.
Id. at 60 n. 21.
71. Id. at 56.
72. Id. at 56-57.
73. Id. at 57.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 57-58.
78. Id. at58 n.19.
79. Id. (citing Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Republic Steel Corp. v.
Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965)).
80. Id. (citing J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944)).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss1/11
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employee cannot always be presumed, especially where a claim of racial
discrimination is made."'81 Therefore, the Court's legitimate concern was that
enforcement of a mandatory arbitration provision may, in some instances, 2
effectively result in the stripping away of all the employee's forum rights.
The next logical progression for the Supreme Court was to apply the
reasoning of Gardner-Denverto other federal statutory claims. The Court was
83
presented that opportunity in Barrentinev. Arkansas-Best FreightSystem, Inc.
In Barrentine,the Court applied the reasoning of Gardner-Denverto a statutory
84
claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA").
The BarrentineCourt provided that "[n]ot all disputes between an employee
and his employer are suited for binding resolution in accordance with the
procedures established by collective bargaining." s5 Specifically, the Court
suggested that "[w]hile courts should defer to arbitral decision where the
employee's claim is based on rights arising out of the collective bargaining
agreement, different considerations apply where the employee's claim is based
on rights arising out of a statute designed to provide minimum substantive
guarantees to individual workers."86 Therefore, the Court held that an arbitration
provision contained within a collective bargaining agreement could not serve as
an effective waiver of an employee's judicial forum.87
In so holding, the Barrentine Court specifically expressed concern with
unions having exclusive control over the extent and manner in which the
arbitration process takes place. 8 The Court suggested that because a union's
proper objective is to maximize overall compensation of its members, and not
to ensure that each employee receives the best compensation deal available, "a
union balancing individual and collective interests might validly permit some
employees' statutorily granted wage and hour benefits to be sacrificed if an
alternative expenditure of resources would result in increased benefits for
workers in the bargaining unit as a whole. 89 Additionally, the Court expressed

81. Id. (citing Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944);
Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944)).
82. If, for example, the Union determined the employee did not have a legitimate
claim.
83. 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
84. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994).
85. Barrentine,450 U.S. at 737.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 745.
88. Id. at 742.
89. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981) (citing
Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 349 (1964) ("We are not ready to find a breach of
the collective bargaining agent's duty of fair representation in taking a good faith
position contrary to that of some individuals whom it represents nor in supporting the
position of one group of employees against that of another."); Ford Motor Co. v.
Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337-39 (1953)).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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grave concern with the general lack of competence of arbitrators to decide
federal law issues.9" The Court suggested that "even [where] a particular
arbitrator may be competent to interpret and apply statutory law, he may not
have the contractual authority to do so." 9' That is, an arbitrator "has no general
authority to invoke the public laws that conflict with the bargain between the
parties. 92
The Court progressed one step further in McDonald v. City of West
Branch.93 In McDonald,the Court applied the Gardner-Denverreasoning to an
employee's Section 1983 claim.94 After restating much of its prior holdings in
both Gardner-Denverand Barrentine,the McDonaldCourt stated: "[A]ccording
preclusive effect to arbitration awards in Section 1983 claims would severely
undermine the protection of federal rights that the statute is designed to
provide." 95 As such, the Court held that where an employee arbitrated his
Section 1983 statutory claim pursuant to the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement, that employee could not be collaterally estopped from bringing his
Section 1983 claim to federal court.96
In sum, during the 1970s and 1980s, the Supreme Court consistently held
that mandatory arbitration clauses contained within collective bargaining
agreements could not serve as effective waivers of employees' federal forum
rights for statutory claims. 97
C. The Individually-NegotiatedWaiver ofFederalStatutory Claims:
ArbitrationPrevails
While Gardner-Denverand its progeny expressed extreme discomfort with
mandatory arbitration of statutory claims in the collective bargaining arena, this
discomfort was not present for mandatory arbitration of all statutory claims
within the individual bargaining arena.98 The absence of such discomfort was
due in large part to the presence of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 which

90. Id. at 743 n.21. ("Because the 'specialized competence of arbitrators pertains

primarily to the law of the shop, not the law of the land,' many arbitrators may not be
conversant with the public law considerations underlying the FLSA.") (citations omitted).
The Court further noted that "'a substantial portion of labor arbitrators are not lawyers.'
Id. at 743 n.21 (quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57 n.18 (1974)).
91. Id. at 744.
92. Id.
93. 466 U.S. 284 (1984).
94. Id. at 285.
95. Id. at 292.
96. Id.
97. See supra notes 65-96 and accompanying text.
98. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
99. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss1/11
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applied to individually-negotiated arbitration clauses, but not to those clauses
obtained through collective bargaining."°°
In the cases termed the Mitsubishi Trilogy,'0 ' the Supreme Court was asked
to decide whether private agreements to arbitrate antitrust and federal securities
claims signed by securities investors10 2 and automobile dealers 3 could establish
arbitration as the exclusive forum available to the individuals. In dealing with
these claims, the Court dismissed the arguments that arbitration was an
inadequate forum for all statutory claims and held that "[b]y agreeing to arbitrate
a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the
statute; it
only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial,
14
forum.'
The Mitsubishicases further held that parties are bound by their pre-dispute
agreements to arbitrate "unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to
preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue."-05
Finally, the Mitsubishi line of cases disregarded the attacks placed on the
efficacy of the arbitral process and provided that such attacks were "far out of
step with [the] current strong endorsement of the federal statutes favoring this
method of resolving disputes.'' 6
The next logical progression for the Court concerning individuallynegotiated waivers was Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp.0 7 In Gilmer,
a sixty-two year old registered securities representative filed suit under the
ADEA0 5 after being fired by his employer.0 9 The employer filed a motion to

compel arbitration (as the exclusive forum) pursuant to the existing arbitration
agreement in Gilmer's registration application."0 The Court held that the ADEA
claim could be subjected to exclusive compulsory arbitration."'

100. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 466 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
101. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477,48586 (1989) (holding pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate claims under Securities Act of 1933
enforceable); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238, 242
(1987) (extending compulsory arbitration by private contract to securities industry and
approving compulsory arbitration under RICO); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymoutl, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626-27 (1985) (upholding arbitration by private
contract regarding antitrust claims).
102. Rodriguez de QuUas, 490 U.S. at 477; Shearson/American,482 U.S. at 220.
103. Mitsubishi,473 U.S. at 617.
104. Id. at 628.
105. Id.
106. Rodriguez de Quifas, 490 U.S. at 481.
107. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
108. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
109. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.
110. Id. at24.
111. Id. at 26-27.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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In holding Gilmer's ADEA claim subject to mandatory (exclusive)
arbitration, the Court stated that a party must be held to an agreement to arbitrate
claims absent congressional intent "to preclude [such] a waiver."'" 2 In addition,
the Court rejected Gilmer's host of challenges concerning the inadequacy of
arbitration procedures." 3 Gilmer first argued that arbitration panels would be
biased. 14 The Court, however, "decline[d] to indulge in the presumption that the
parties and the arbitral body conducting a proceeding [would] be unable or
unwilling to retain competent, conscientious and impartial arbitrators.""..5 Gilmer
next argued that arbitration was an inappropriate forum in that the discovery
allowed in arbitration was much more limited than in the federal courts." 6 The
Court suggested, however, that this limitation was of little harm because
arbitrators were not bound by the Federal Rules of Evidence." 7
The Gilmer Court, in dicta, concluded by distinguishing the GardnerDenver cases on three grounds. First, the Gilmer Court recognized that in labormanagement arbitration the issue is contractual, rather than statutory, in nature." 8
Second, the Court reasoned that there may be a tension between the union's
interest in collective representation and individual interests, such that the union
may not be an adequate representative in negotiating a waiver of an individual's
statutory rights." 9 Finally, the Court recognized that the Gardner-Denverline
of cases was not decided under the FAA, which reflected a "liberal federal
policy favoring arbitration agreements.' 20
Therefore, the Supreme Court, through the Mitsubishi cases and the Gilmer
case, affirmatively announced a radical shift towards favoritism of mandatory
2
and exclusive arbitration of federal statutory employment claims.' '

D. The Existing CircuitSplit over the Enforceabilityof UnionNegotiated Waivers ofFederalStatutory Claims After Gilmer
An important issue arguably remained unresolved by the United States
Supreme Court. That issue was whether the Court in Gilmer intended to
establish two separate and distinct rules for individually bargained agreements

112. Id. at26.

113. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
114. Id.
115. Id. (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 634 (1985)).
116. Id. at31.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 35.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See supra notes 98-120 and accompanying text.
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and collectively bargained agreements. Not surprisingly, the federal circuits
have provided different answers.2

All but one of the federal circuits deciding the issue have held that the
Supreme Court's holding in Gilmer failed to displace the holding of GardnerDenver regarding mandatory arbitration of statutory claims within the collective
bargaining realm. 3 Perhaps most representative of the majority view within the
circuits is the Sixth Circuit's decision in Pryner v. TractorSupply Co. 24
In Pryner,the Sixth Circuit recognized the ostensible conflict between the
Gilmer and Gardner-Denvercase lines, noting that "[e]ach side has its favorite
Supreme Court case that it [may] flog[] mercilessly to yield the desired
holding."'125 However, after a thorough analysis of Supreme Court precedent, as
well as the relevant public policy concerns, the Pryner court concluded that a
union may not enter into an enforceable collective bargaining agreement on
behalf of its member-employees with their employer "that consigns the
enforcement of statutory rights to the union-controlled grievance and arbitration
machinery created by the agreement."'2 6

In so holding, the Prynercourt first examined the employer's argument that
such mandatory arbitration provisions do "not take away any of the workers'
substantive statutory rights, but merely substitute an arbitral for a judicial
proceeding as the means of vindicating the rights."'127 The court, however,
suggested that in many instances the remedies available to an arbitrator, as well
as the rights conferred under a collective bargaining agreement, will fall short of
fully vindicating the employee's substantive rights.'28 In response, the

122. See Albertson's, Inc. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 157 F.3d
758, 762 (9th Cir. 1998) (refusing to compel arbitration of FLSA claim), cert. denied,
120 S.Ct. 39 (1999); Penny v. UPS, 128 F.3d 408, 412-14 (6th Cir. 1997) (refusing to
compel arbitration of an ADA claim); Brisenstine v. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 117
F.3d 519, 526-27 (1lth Cir. 1997) (refusing to compel arbitration of an ADA claim);
Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437, 1451-54 (10th Cir. 1997) (refusing to
compel arbitration of Title VII claim), rev'd on othergrounds, 524 U.S. 947 (1998), affd

on remand, 158 F.3d. 1371, 1377 (10th Cir. 1998) (affirming previous holding that
employee is not compelled to seek arbitration of Title VII claim); Pryner v. Tractor

Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 365 (7th Cir. 1997) (refusing to compel arbitration of Title VII
claim), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 912 (1997); Varner v. National Super Markets, Inc., 94
F.3d 1209, 1213 (8th Cir. 1996) (refusing to compel arbitration of Title VII claim), cert.
denied, 519 U.S. 110 (1997); Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d
875, 877 (4th Cir. 1996) (compelling arbitration of an ADA and Title VII claim), cert.
denied, 519 U.S. 980 (1996); Tran v. Tran, 54 F.3d 115, 118 (2d Cir. 1995) (refusing to
compel arbitration of a FLSA claim), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1134 (1996).
123. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

109 F.3d 354 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 912 (1997).
Id. at 363-64.
Id. at 363.
Id. at 361.
Id.
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employers, and their amici, argued that where arbitration does in fact fall short
of fully vindicating an employee's substantive rights, the employee is free to
resume his suit in federal court.' 29 However, the court was not satisfied with this
result because an employee would be required to go through two separate
proceedings before having his substantive statutory rights properly vindicated. 30
The Pryner court was also concerned that "the grievance and arbitration
procedure [could] be invoked only by the union, and not by the worker."'' For
example, the court feared that sometimes an employee will be unable to persuade
the union to submit his claim to arbitration. 3 2 In response, the employers
pointed out "that if the union arbitrarily refuse[d] to prosecute a grievance, let
alone refuse[d] on racial or other invidious grounds to do so, the [employee
could] bring suit against the union for breach of its duty of fair representation.' 33
Again, the Prynercourt was unsatisfied, noting that "[t]his raises the spectre of
three suits to enforce a statutory right-the suit against the union to force it to
grieve and if necessary arbitrate the grievance, the arbitration proceeding, and
the resumed district court proceeding if the workers' rights under the collective
bargaining agreement are more limited than their statutory rights.' 3 4 Moreover,
the court recognized that in many situations a union may decide not to prosecute
or arbitrate a grievance due to "tactical and strategic" factors.' 35 Under such
circumstances, the union's broad discretion may very well not give rise to a
breach of fair representation.'36 The court therefore suggested that where an
employee asked the union to grieve a statutory violation, he could not have great
if the union did
confidence in knowing that either the union would do so, or that
3
not, the courts would intervene and force the union to do so.
The Prynercourt noted that the "essential conflict [was] between majority
and minority rights.' 38 The court stated that "[w]e may assume that the union
will not engage in actionable discrimination against minority workers. But we
may not assume that [the union] will be highly sensitive to their special interests,
which are the interests protected by Title VII and the other discrimination
Therefore, the court concluded that the enforcement of the
statutes ...,,139

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
(1983)).

Id.
Id. at 361-62.
Id. at 362.
Id.
Id. (citing DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 164

134. Id.

135. Id.
136. Id. (citing Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191-92 (1967)).
137. Id.

138. Id.
139. Id.
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statutory rights of minorities should not be placed in the hands of the majority
unions. 4 o
Finally, the Prynercourt suggested that it was "not holding that workers'
statutory rights are never arbitrable."'' Rather, the court stated that "[i]f the
worker brings suit, the employer suggests that their dispute be arbitrated, the
worker agrees, and the collective bargaining agreement does not preclude such
side agreements,"' 42 then there would be nothing to prevent binding
arbitration. 43 Moreover, the court noted that while Gilmer "pruned" some of the
dicta of Gardner-Denver,it certainly could not "be taken to hold that collective
bargaining agreements can compel the arbitration of statutory rights.'"
The Fourth Circuit, however, in Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass
Container,Inc., 44 held that it was proper for the district court to grant summary
judgment against an employee who failed to submit her Title VII and ADA
claims to mandatory arbitration pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement'
In so holding, the court cited Gilmer, stating "that arbitration of a statutory claim
is not equal to giving up any right under a statute, it is simply another forum in
47
which to resolve the dispute.',
The Austin court continued by looking to the language of the amendments
to Title VII and the ADA. 48 The court noted that both statutes contain identical
language: "Where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use of
alternative means of dispute resolution, including... arbitration, is encouraged
to resolve disputes arising under the Acts or provisions" of federal law.'49 The
court further suggested that a study of the legislative history did not reveal any
congressional hostility towards arbitration. 50 Therefore, the Austin court
concluded that because Gilmer required there to be some evidence of
congressional intent to preclude arbitration, and because no such evidence
existed, the parties were bound by their arms-length agreement to arbitrate their
claims.''

140. Id. at 363.
141. Id. (citing Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 899
(4th Cir. 1996)) (other citations omitted).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 365.
145. 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 980 (1996).
146. Id. at 877.
147. Id. at 880.
148. Id. at 881.
149. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12212 (1994)).
150. Id. The court however recognized one conference report that stated: "It is the
intent of the conferees that the use of these alternative dispute resolution procedures is
completely voluntary." Id.
151. Id.
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Finally, in Austin, the court noted that unions indeed have "the right and
duty to bargain for the terms and conditions of employment."' Through this
collective bargaining process, the court provided: "[U]nions may waive the right53
Act."'
to strike and other rights protected under the National Labor Relations
Further, the Austin court noted that the Supreme Court had previously
determined such waivers valid because they firmly rested within the premise of
fair representation. 54 Therefore, the court held that there was "no reason to
and a union
distinguish between a union bargaining
55 away the right to strike
bargaining for the right to arbitrate."'
In conclusion, while several federal district courts 5 6 have agreed with the
the remaining federal circuits to have addressed the issue
reasoning of Austin, a1l
have adopted a rationale similar to that ofPrynerv. TractorSupply Co.157 With

this existing split among the circuits, all eyes and ears were sharply focused on
the Supreme Court as it handed down5 8its decision in the principal case, Wright
v. UniversalMaritimeService Corp.
IV. INSTANT DECISION

In Wright v. UniversalMaritimeService Corp.,5 9 the Supreme Court held
that the general arbitration clause contained within the CBA failed to establish
a clear and unmistakable waiver of Wright's rights to a judicial forum for
resolution of his federal claim of employment discrimination. 6 At the same
time, however, the Court specifically declined to hold6whether such a "clear and
unmistakable" waiver would in fact be enforceable.1 '
In so holding, the Court first examined the language contained within the
CBA.' 62 Specifically, the agreement provided that "all matters affecting wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment' 63 would be covered
under the arbitration agreement. The Court then recognized that the Fourth
Circuit had concluded that this general arbitration provision "was sufficiently

152. Id. at 885.
153. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994); Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB,
460 U.S. 693, 705 (1983)).

154. Id. (citing MetropolitanEdison, 460 U.S. at 705).
155. Id.
156. See Jessie v. Carter Health Care Ctr., Inc., 930 F. Supp. 1174 (E.D. Ky. 1996),
overruled by Bratten v. SSI Servs., Inc., 185 F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 1999); Conners v.
Amisub Inc., No. 96-6188-CIV, 1996 WL 406677 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 2, 1996).
157. 109 F.3d 354, 365 (1997).
158. 525 U.S. 70 (1998).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 82.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 72-73.
163. Id. at 73.
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broad to encompass a statutory claim arising under the ADA, and that such a
provision was enforceable." ' 64 The circuit court's conclusion, the Court noted,
brought into question the continued vitality of two diverging lines of Supreme
Court precedent. 16 The holdings of Alexander v. Gardner-DenverCo.'66 and
Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp. 67 represent these two diverging lines
of authority.
The Court then examined its prior holding in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co. 6 1 The Court noted that in Gardner-Denverit had held that "an employee
does not forfeit his right to a judicial forum for claimed discriminatory discharge
in violation of Title VII [ ] if 'he first pursues his grievance to final arbitration
69
under the nondiscrimination clause of a collective bargaining agreement."")7
The Court further recognized that the Gardner-Denver Court held that a
statutory cause of action could not be waived by an agreement to arbitrate within
a collective bargaining agreement because "there [could] be no prospective
waiver of an employee's rights under Title VII.,' 170 Finally, the Court noted that
it had, several times previously, applied the holding of Gardner-Denverwhen
"deciding the effect of [collective bargaining agreement] arbitration upon
employee claims under other statutes."''
Next, the Court examined its prior holding in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp.'7 The Court noted that in Gilmer it had held that "a claim under the
[ADEA] could be subject to compulsory arbitration pursuant to an arbitration
provision in a securities registration form."' 73 The Court noted that it had several
times previously held that "statutory claims may be the subject of an arbitration
agreement, enforceable pursuant to the FAA."' 74
After discussing both Gilmer and Gardner-Denver,the Court recognized
that "[t]here [was] obviously some tension between these two lines of cases.' 7 s
Specifically, the Court reiterated that "[w]hereas Gardner-Denverstated that 'an

164. Id. at75.
165. Id.
166. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
167. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
168. Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 75-76 (1998).
169. Id. (citing Gardner-Denver,415 U.S. at 49-50).
170. Id. at 76 (citing Gardner-Denver,415 U.S. at 51).
171. Id. (citing McDonald v. West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984) (claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1994)); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S. 728
(1981) (claim under Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994)).
172. Id. (discussing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991)).
173. Wright, 525 U.S. at 76 (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23).
174. Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 76 (1998) (citing
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989);
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985)).

175. Id.
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employee's rights under Title VII are not susceptible of prospective waiver,'
Gilmer held that the right to a federal judicial forum for an ADEA claim could
be waived."" 77 The Court first entertained the arguments of Petitioner-Wright
and the United States as amicus.'78 They argued that federal forum rights could
not be waived in union-negotiated collective bargaining agreements, even if they
could be waived in individually executed contracts. 79 The Court recognized that
8 Next, the
such a distinction "assuredly [found] support in the text of Gilmer."'"
Court entertained the arguments of Respondents and their numerous amici., "
They argued that the real distinction between the two lines of cases was "the
radical change, over the [past] two decades, in the Court's receptivity to
arbitration.' '8 However, the Court abruptly ended the discussion by stating:
"[W]e find it unnecessary to resolve the question of the validity of a unionnegotiated waiver."' 83 Instead, the Court determined that on the facts presented,

no such waiver had occurred."
In so holding, the Court first addressed Respondent's argument that because
there was a presumption of arbitrability, stemming from Section 301 of the
LMRA, 85 the general language of the arbitration clause should be sufficient to
encompass Wright's statutory claims.'86 The Court stated, however, that the
presumption does "not extend beyond ihe reach of the principal rationale that
justifies it, which is that arbitrators are in a better position than courts to interpret
the terms of a [collective bargaining agreement].' 81 7 The Court then noted that
the cause of action which Wright asserted arose from the ADA, not from the
Therefore, the Court
CBA between the Union and Wright's employer.'
concluded, because the ultimate question for the arbitrator in this case would be
what in fact federal law (the ADA) required, not what the CBA required, the
presumption of arbitrability should not appropriately extend to Wright's statutory
claims." 9

176.
(1974)).
177.
(1991)).
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id. at 76-77 (quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 50, 51-52
Id. at 77 (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
29 U.S.C. § 185 (1994).
Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 77-78 (1998).
Id. at 78.
Id. at 79.
Id.
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Finally, the Court stated that Wright's statutory claim was not subject to a
presumption of arbitrability, and that any collective bargaining agreement to
arbitrate statutory claims must be "clear and unmistakable."' 90 The Court
referenced its prior holding in MetropolitanEdison Co. v. NLRB,' 9' where it held

that a union could waive its officers' statutory rights under Section 8(a)(3) of the
"' only if the waiver was "clear
NLRA 92
and unmistakable."'

93

The Court then

determined that this same "clear and unmistakable" standard was applicable to
union-negotiated waivers of employees' statutory rights to judicial forums for

claims of employment discrimination.'94 The Court applied this standard to the
waiver contained within the CBA and determined that the waiver was
'
unenforceable because it was not "clear and unmistakable."' 95
Therefore, the

Court vacated the Fourth Circuit's holding and remanded the case for further
proceedings consistent with its holding.'96
V. COMMENT

The Supreme Court's decision in Wright is well supported by the Court's
previous precedent. One need look no further than the Court's decision in
Metropolitan Edison v. NLRB 97 to find that a waiver of forum rights to a
statutory claim must be "clear and unmistakable."' 98 However, one cannot help
but be disappointed with the Court for its refusal to go one step further and
decide whether a "clear and unmistakable" waiver is in fact enforceable.
Certainly, the Court's decision rests comfortably within the doctrine ofjudicial
restraint because this particular issue was not technically relevant to the facts of
the Wright case. However, one need not search long before finding numerous
instances where the Court has gone well out of its way to decide issues that
clearly were not then before it.
With that said, the remainder of this Note provides both an analysis of the
considerations that the Court would likely have discussed had it chosen to
resolve the existing split over the principal issue as well as a discussion of the
likely impact this case will have on the future of union-negotiated arbitration
clauses.
190. Id. at 79-80 (citing Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693 (1983);
Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 125 (1994) (dictum); Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic
Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 409 n.9 (1988) (dictum)). But see Mastro Plastics Corp. v.
NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 283 (1956).
191. 460 U.S. 693 (1983).

192. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1994).
193. MetropolitanEdison, 460 U.S. at 708.
194. Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 80 (1998).
195. Id. at 82.
196. Id.
197. 460 U.S. 693 (1983).
198. Id. at 709.
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A. PotentialConsiderationsfor the Supreme Court in Resolution of
the Existing CircuitSplit
As a base point, the initial query should be whether the Supreme Court's
prior holding in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. 199 is still good law.
Therefore, an appropriate discussion would need to consider whether the Court
still adheres, at least to some extent, to the underlying rationales involved in the
Gardner-Denverholding, or alternatively whether these rationales have been
by the Court's later holding in Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane
supplanted
200
Corp.
The first rationale given by the Court in Gardner-Denverfor not allowing
mandatory arbitration of statutory claims within the collective bargaining arena
was the inadequacy of the arbitral process. 20 ' This rationale, however, has been
rejected by the Mitsubishi Trilogy and Gilmer.2° In fact, the Court has provided:
"[W]e are well past the time when judicial suspicion of the desirability of
arbitration and of the competence of arbitral tribunals inhibited the development
of arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution."0 3
The Court's reversal in attitude from hostility toward reception of
arbitration appears justifiable. For example, as the Gilmer Court noted, modem
arbitration proceedings now commonly provide discovery provisions, which
allow for document production, information requests, depositions, and
subpoenas. 20 4 Additionally, in modem arbitration proceedings, the arbitrator
may be required to issue the award in writing, name the parties, summarize the
issues involved, and describe the award issued.20 5 Moreover, the competency of
the arbitrator can no longer be questioned, for "most labor arbitrators have
experience in labor law or labor relations. ''206 In fact, many labor-management
arbitrators are lawyers or law professors who have expansive knowledge of the
intricate legal issues involved. Finally, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service ("FMCS") has since been established, and it provides well trained labormanagement arbitrators. 0 7
However, several arguments suggest that arbitration is not entirely
commensurate with the judicial forum. While arbitration should be commended

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
27 (1985).
204.
205.

415 U.S. 36 (1974).
500 U.S. 20 (1991).
Gardner-Denver,415 U.S. at 56.
500 U.S. 20 (1991).
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 31.
Id. at 31-32.

206. See LEONARD L. RISKIN

& JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND

LAWYERS: ABRIDGED EDITION 123 (1987).

207. Id.
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for its timely resolution of grievances, an unfortunate side effect may be that
individual grievances go unheard. For example, in Wright, the labor agreement
provided that all grievances were to be referred in writing to a grievance
committee within forty-eight hours.20 3 So then, as in Wright, where an individual
is unsuccessful in persuading the union to pursue his grievance within forty-eight
hours, that individual's statutory claim may very well be defaulted.209 This result
would follow even if the individual had retained an attorney within fifteen days
of the dispute. 2'0 Therefore, even assuming that the labor arbitration process was
commensurate with the judicial forum, the potential that an individual may not
have the opportunity to proceed with an arbitration proceeding is entirely
plausible.
In addition, the arbitrator in a labor-management arbitration proceeding may
not have the full range of statutory remedies available to her. Unlike the
situation in Gilmer, where the relevant rules for securities arbitration did not
restrict the remedies available, labor arbitrators will many times be limited in
their available remedies. 1 Moreover, the Court has recently determined that
arbitrators in securities arbitration cases, like Gilmer,have the authority to award
punitive damages. The Court, however, has nowhere suggested that arbitrators
in labor-management cases may award punitive damages. In addition, many
collectively-bargained arbitration clauses, like the one in Wright, will only
require the employer "to make financial restitution." Such language generally
connotes back pay, and possibly fringe benefits, and therefore it is doubtful that
an arbitrator, pursuant to such a provision, would be given the authority to issue
compensatory and punitive damages.2 3
Further, many labor-management arbitration mechanisms provide a system
where the individual is to first present his claim to a grievance committee
composed of representatives from labor and management.2 4 As such, if a
mutual decision is reached by this committee, that decision will be considered
"final and binding."215 Under such circumstances, an individual will not have the
opportunity to bring his claim to an otherwise independent arbitration
proceeding. Moreover, many times these grievance committees are composed
of members who are not lawyers, and who many times may have no formal
education beyond high school. 216
208. Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70,72 (1998).

209. See Petitioner's Brief, Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70
(1998) (No. 97-889), available in 1998 WL 232769, at *31.
210. Id.
211. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32 (1991).

212. See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995).
213. See Petitioner's Brief, Wright (No. 97-889), available in 1998 WL 232769,

at *34.
214. Id. at 35.
215. Id.

216. Id.
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Finally, the procedural limitations of labor-management arbitration may
make it incompatible with the resolution of statutory claims. While the Court in
Gilmer flatly rejected such an assertion by Gilmer, it did so only after noting that
the relevant rules for securities arbitration authorized both a limited amount of
discovery and that arbitration awards be placed in writing to allow public
access.217 However, in the labor-management arbitration arena, the rules for
securities arbitration are irrelevant.
Second, and perhaps more problematic, the Gardner-Denver Court
expressed concern about whether a union should be allowed to waive an
individual's statutory rights because of the union's overall goal of increasing the
welfare of its members collectively. 2 8 While many courts have been willing to
assume that a majority-backed union will not itself engage in actionable
discrimination against minority employees, these same courts have refused to
assume that a union will be highly sensitive to the minorities' interests. 1 9
Because these minority interests are those protected by Title VII, the ADA, the
FLSA, and the ADEA, it is highly problematic to allow unions exclusive control
over the manner and extent to which these statutory claims are handled.
The grievance and arbitration procedures provided for in collective
bargaining agreements can only be invoked by the union.220 Therefore, the
employee must persuade the union to prosecute his grievance or submit it to
arbitration, or the employee's claim may well be lost forever.22' Employers are
quick to suggest, however, that if indeed "the union arbitrarily refuses to
prosecute a grievance, let alone refuses on racial or other invidious grounds," the
worker may bring an action against the union for a breach of its duty of fair
representation. m However, there are three major critiques of such an argument.
First, this will force the individual to be involved in two suits simply to have his
rights vindicated. Specifically, the employee will be required not only to bring
a suit against the union to force it to arbitrate the grievance, but also to go
through the arbitration process to have his grievance heard. Second, a union
may very well refuse to arbitrate an employee's grievance without being found
in breach of its duty of fair representation. For example, a union has broad
discretion in deciding whether to prosecute a grievance, and "may take into
account tactical and strategic factors such as its limited resources and consequent
need to establish priorities. 223 Third, if the employee was successful in his
breach of duty of fair representation claim against the union, the employer (and
initial wrongdoer) would be greatly benefitted. That is, where a union has

217. See Gilmer v. Interstate Johnson/Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31-32 (1991).
218. McMillian, supranote 37, at 310-11.
219. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
220. See Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 362 (7th Cir. 1997).

221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
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breached its duty of fair representation, it is held solely liable for all of the
worker's losses after the time the union's breach caused the losses to continue. 24
As such, the employer will be relieved of much of the liability for harm it has
wrongly caused.
On the other hand, one might question whether the tension between the
majority-backed union and the minority-employee is counterbalanced by other
considerations. For example, the Gilmer Court held that individuals may
effectively bargain away their federal forum rights through mandatory arbitration
provisions. 2 ' Likewise, the Gilmer Court rejected the argument that "mere
inequality in bargaining power" is enough to void a clause compelling arbitration
of statutory claims.226 Therefore, one potential result of Gilmer may be that
enforcement of individually-negotiated arbitration clauses will dilute individual
statutory rights to a working environment free from discrimination because
employers may simply offer such clauses on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.227
However, in the collective bargaining realm, unions possess more bargaining
power than individual employees. As such, an arbitration clause contained
within a collective bargaining agreement is much more likely to result from an
arms-length bargain than is one contained within an individual employment
contract. Therefore, one could reasonably argue that because the Court has
enforced mandatory arbitration clauses within individually-negotiated
agreements, the mandatory arbitration clauses contained within collective
bargaining agreements should certainly be enforceable.
Third, the Gardner-Denverdecision was not decided under the FAA,228 as
was the Court's decision in Gilmer. Instead, Section 301 of the LMRA 9
provides the vehicle for establishing uniform construction of collective
bargaining agreements." Therefore, it would seem inappropriate to suggest that
the Court's decision in Gilmer, which was predicated on an entirely different
statute, would have any detrimental effect on its prior decision in GardnerDenver. Even the Gilmer case supports this proposition. Quite simply, the
GihnerCourt distinguished its case from the Gardner-Denverline of cases by
noting that those cases were not decided under the FAA, which reflected a
"liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.'"
In conclusion, a majority of the arguments suggest that the holding of
Gardner-Denverwould, or perhaps should, be followed by the Court even after
its decision in Gilmer. Still, the Gilmer case casts doubt on the firmness of the

224. See Bowen v. U.S. Postal Serv., 459 U.S. 212 (1983) (emphasis added).
225. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33-34 (1991).
226. Id. at 33.
227. McMillian, supra note 37, at 311.

228.
229.
230.
231.

9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994).
29 U.S.C. § 185 (1994).
See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957).
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991).
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B. PotentialImpact ofSupreme Court'sHolding in Wright
At first glance, it may appear that the Supreme Court's decision in Wright
was uneventful or unimportant. One might suggest that the only result of the
Court's decision is that now employers will simply change the language in
arbitration agreements so that such agreements comport with the "clear and
unmistakable" standard. However, such a suggestion would be unfair to the
numerous considerations involved. One must first consider the effect of the
Wright decision on not only the employer, but also the individual employees and
the union.
As discussed above, the individual employees have perhaps the most to lose
when a waiver of their rights to bring statutory claims to federal court occurs.
Quite simply, by agreeing to such a waiver, the individual employees place
themselves at the mercy of the union. If the employees are unable to persuade
the union to arbitrate their claims, they may be stripped of all their available
forums. Certainly this is a major concern for individual employees. Still,
individual employees may decide that they would prefer an arbitration
mechanism over a judicial forum. Perhaps the employees fear that they would
either be unable to afford an attorney, or alternatively, unable to convince an
attorney to take their claims on a contingency basis due to the small amount of
damages available.
Putting aside the considerations of individual employees, the union may
also be unwilling to argue "clear and unmistakable" waiver language within the
arbitration provision. Quite simply, the union may not want to put itself in the
position of having to defend itself against employee charges of breach of its duty
of fair representation if the union decides not to pursue every individual
employee's grievance to arbitration.
As a practical matter, negotiations between employers and unions may well
lead to compromise. A union might agree to enter into a "clear and
unmistakable" waiver of its member-employee's federal forum rights in
exchange for the right of its employees to seek arbitration with the employer
even ifthe union decides not to seek arbitration on the employee's behalf. Under
this compromise, the employer, the union, and the individual employees will
benefit. First, the employer will benefit because it will not be forced to defend
itself against statutory claims in federal court. Instead, all claims will necessarily
be resolved in arbitration. Second, the union will benefit because it will no
longer be forced to pursue every employee grievance to arbitration in fear that
a court may later find that the union breached its duty of fair representation.
Finally, the employee will benefit because he or she will be guaranteed a forum
to resolve disputes, regardless of whether the union decides not to pursue the
claim on the employee's behalf.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss1/11
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VI. CONCLUSION

After Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp., it remains unclear
whether mandatory arbitration clauses contained within collective bargaining
agreements are effective in establishing arbitration as the exclusive forum for
resolution of federal statutory claims. However, the Sypreme Court's decision
in Wright may prove very important in collective bargaining labor relations.
Quite simply, unions and employers will now be forced to determine whether a
"clear and unmistakable" waiver of federal forum rights for individual statutory
claims is mutually agreeable. Perhaps the end result of these negotiations may
be a compromise, whereby not just the employer's but also the union's and the
individual employees' rights receive equal protection.
ROBERT M. SMITH
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